It is in these and a variety of other ways that the altruistic donation of body parts of living persons operate.
The word is altruism. It is the pride of the ideal. The ultimate aspiration of ethical medical science -but, sadly, not an easy to attain state. It is the willingness to do things that bring advantages to others, even if it results in disadvantage for oneself. It is self-sacrifice, public-spiritedness, humanitarianism, just to mention a few of its equivalents. 10 Suffices to say that in this context altruism is the gifting of one's body part to another without expecting something in return, especially money or its equivalent. This paper now turns to the possibility that any purpose other altruism informs the donation of body parts; and the ethical and or legal issues surrounding the alternative purposes. . 10 Its synonyms also include -unselfishness, selflessness, self-denial, consideration, compassion, kindness, goodwill, decency, nobility, generosity, magnanimity, liberality, open-handedness, free-handedness, bigheartedness, lavishness, benevolence, beneficence, philanthropy, charity, charitableness. This paper shall however stick with the limited meaning of self-sacrifice, unless the context otherwise suggests.
receivers. There are often questions about the process of donation, obtaining informed consent -like the exercise of the right to donate in the event of an underage or one who is incapable of consenting to his organ being donated as a result of the state of the mind or body. Should the organ of such a person be used to facilitate the treatment of another family member? This raises another set of serious ethical concerns. What if the donor is motivated by anything but pure altruism? Where is the line drawn in the spectrum of altruism, what point on the continuum from the high end of pure to impure is acceptable, legal and ethical? When does altruism cease to be pure altruism and how does the law respond? For the benefit of undertaking a focused discussion of these points this paper shall consider the exact scope of the donation of body parts by living persons during their lives, with the ability to give informed consent. The only question sought to be resolved therefore is whether or not altruism could be placed side by side the seeking of pecuniary gain for the donation of body parts by a living person capable of giving the requisite consent.
Whether the body part was that of the living or dead made a difference because the proposition had always been that a body part, for so long as it is joined to a living body, is not susceptible of ownership; then when excised from the body it would be an ownerless thing.
14 Thus the use of skills translates a body part to an item that is capable of being owned. Intuitively however it appears unfair to the source of that body part. A more realistic and just approach, which is supported by authorities in both the Common Law and modern Civil Law 15 is that a part removed from a person's body, say in the course of an operation, is automatically owned by that person by operation of law. Since the dead donor is incapable of, at the very least, feeling the pain or considering after-donation care, the scope here as to the role of altruism on the decision of the living is apt. While next of kin or other relatives may suffer emotionally and otherwise, they are unable to share in the physical circumstances of the donor for whom altruistic considerations are relevant.
The Different Shades of Altruism
Sometimes, the pervasiveness of a term gives the impression that its meaning is unequivocal, particularly when the term is one that fits into a variety of multi-disciplinary contexts. It might lack the precision, uniformity, and neutrality that academic terms are supposed to have. 16 The term "altruism" seems to belong in this category as it broadly has both economic and psychological imports, in addition to a range of others. It is here intended to examine how the term may apply to organ donation, from the angle of what informs the decision to act altruistically.
When people make donations towards privately provided public goods, such as charity, there may be many factors influencing their decisions other than altruism. As Olson noted, people are sometimes motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, or even to avoid scorn. 17 Social pressure, guilt, sympathy, or simply a desire for a "warm glow" may also play important roles in the decisions to act charitably or altruistically. The question then is if the donor is motivated by any of these impulses that seem to likewise give the donor some benefit, however intangible that benefit may be, is it still purely altruistic? If the altruist is ex ante aware of the possibility that the recipient's need for clothes has been caused by the recipient's distaste for work, the act of altruism might be laced with condescending pity. Or might one then slide down the scale to another kind of altruism described as impure altruism?
Andreoni who coined the term ''warm glow'', defines ''impure'' altruistic action as the act that is partially motivated by the ''warm glow'', and not purely motivated by the concern over the beneficiary's welfare. This is quite comparable to altruism for egoistic reasons. 18 Andreoni introduced a generalisation of the standard public goods model that includes 'impurely altruistic' motives. In contrast to the impure altruism model, an important alternative approach was to consider moral or group-interested behaviour. 19 Sugden, for instance, showed that public goods approach to philanthropy may flow from people who may adhere to "moral constraints"
or a "principle of reciprocity". 20 It is also clear, needs to be said, from a review of these academic literatures that there must be a purpose for altruistic actions, whether positive or otherwise.
While altruism has been generally accepted as the ethical reason for organ donation, it has been defined in ways that allow various shades of the word to purport the ethical ground for donation of organs and body parts. In the UK for example, altruism has long been taken to be the guiding principle of ethical organ donation, and has been used as justification for rejecting or allowing certain types of donation. But despite this central role, altruism has been poorly defined in policy and position documents, and increasingly used confusingly and inconsistently. 21 The recent report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics offered a clearer definition. This definition that altruism "entailing a selfless gift to others without expectation of remuneration" 22 is however, more permissive than that of altruism previously seen in UK policy, and as a result allows some donations that previously have been considered unacceptable. These include conditional and directed donations by organ donors where a condition could serve to exclude certain recipients, or others are excluded because the organ is directed at a certain group, especially relatives -living-related donation. 23 Such limited delineation of altruism means that the Greg and others strongly argued for ethical purpose to go beyond altruism as narrowly defined. They suggest that it should not be insisted upon that altruism is a necessary as opposed to desirable component of ethical donation.
Self-determination at end of life -A Comparative Paradigm
The concept of the person is heavily bound up in the values of the culture in which one lives. An expression of self also is the exercise of the autonomy of choice which is an element in the dignity of the human person. This implies that one is entitled to make choices about how one is treated or how one's body is managed, to put it in the most general terms. It is generally understood as self-governance, self-regulation or self-direction and as the paramount principle that underlies refusal of medical treatment. 28 In most present-day societies a competent patient's refusal of life-prolonging medical treatment must be respected, and the right to selfdetermination thus challenges the arguments based on the sanctity of life. 
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Autonomy is not without its limits. The sanctity of human life gives weight to the argument that "because all lives are intrinsically valuable, it is always wrong intentionally to kill an innocent human being" 32 including the life of the killer, in some situations. Human dignity, it is further argued, does not reside in the freedom to choose to live or to die but is a condition of the freedom itself; individuals cannot give up their human dignity. 33 A more restricted conception of autonomy is that it is an exclusively negative freedom, no more than a right to a "natural" death. Thus, any rights amounting to "right to die", as broadly conceived, has been rejected by the tribunals in England, 34 America, 35 Canada, 36 France, Australia, Germany, and the list goes on. 37 It could be inferred that even in the liberal states, there is still some restriction on any exercise of the expression of the right to die. Thus, in the most unlikely of cases where death is debatably a valid option like in euthanasia, the person is still entitled to the control of his body and the parts thereof. More so when he is alive.
It is because of the moral import of body autonomy that informed consent must be obtained from a person before any organs are harvested from him. This practice is essential because a person cannot engage in autonomous decision-making if he cannot control what happens to his body. Now it is common in medical ethics to give the principle of respect for autonomy the highest priority. And this is why medical ethics generally takes informed consent to be a sacrosanct requirement: it is the guardian of patients' control over what happens to their own bodies. 38 By extension, it appears that body autonomy will also include the choice as to the destination of one's organs; a bit further than the consent to be a donor after death. Yearworth in its holding that the sperm was owned by the producer of it, rather than the establishment that had preserved it. Yearworth was in itself not conclusive on the bundle of rights owned in body parts, and being on reproductive parts, but by its explicit recognition that parts and products of the human body may be the subject of property without the acquisition of different attributes by the application of skill, "it has potentially cleared away a piece of legal artifice that has bemused commentators for some time." 47 The property dimension to body parts thus means that the control of property might be imported into the dynamics in dealings in body parts. The next question is how valid then is the state control of how one deals in one's property? Clearly, a statutory enactment on dealings in private property will be what it is -the law. But how valid is this law, and how consistent is it with the expectations of the society it governs? A survey of such laws coupled with ethical
and moral values will give a cursory view.
In the science of Law and rationality, it has often been propounded that "a human being
is not entitled to sell his limbs for money, even if he were offered ten thousand thalers for a single finger". 48 But this belongs to the discourse when there was no property right in body parts. Although the debate has moved beyond property rights, the bases for no right to deal in one's body parts remain just as valid -the self-respect, humanity and dignity reasons. The criminal law in Israel prohibits doing grievous harm to another or wounding him, even if such harm was done with his consent, unless it has been for his own treatment. 52 Thus an operation for the removal of an organ from a healthy person for transplantation, which is not for the person's treatment, is illegal. Israel's system for organ donation has been based, since its inception in 1968, on a model in which organs for transplantation are retrieved from brain-dead donors only after consent has been obtained from the appropriate first-degree relatives. This consent is needed even if the potential donor has expressed a wish for posthumous organ donation by signing a donor card, a government form that allows people to voluntarily indicate their wish to donate specified organs after their death. 53 It was rather significant that in a case the Supreme Court refused an application to remove a kidney from a retarded person in order to transplant it into his father's body, even without touching on the question of whether it would have been permitted if the son had been an intellectually able adult. 54 It can be argued that this decision was founded on the fact that the son could not give the required consent, as against what his father might have wished for. As regards incapable persons, minors, and anyone under guardianship, the Legal Capability and Guardianship Law 1962 55 of Israel states that a court is not allowed to order any surgery or any other medical measures unless the court has been convinced by medical opinion that these measures are needed to maintain the physical or mental well-being of the minor, incapable person, or person under guardianship. Removal of organs from such a person for transplant is, therefore, illegal.
persons lack dignity, that they are mere objects to be used by others. This ensures there can be no trafficking in human materials.
Even from religious and cultural shared values, the marketization of human body parts poses a problem. For example, in the Islamic faith and practices, as organ transplantation has not been explicitly dealt with in the Koran, there is a mix of opinions among Muslim jurists.
While those from the Arab countries appear to consider it allowable, scholars from the Indian subcontinent believe that organ transplantation is not permissible because human life is sacred; the human body is entrusted to an individual and thus does not belong to him or her; and transplantation can lead to illegal trade in organs and the poor would suffer. ethics. This is as correct as suggesting that all practices in the medical profession are strictly and solely underscored by ethical considerations. They are not mutually exclusive for the practising medical practitioner has as much interest in affording a decent life as he has in giving his patient the services that give them the best chance for a decent life. The altruistic position glosses over the inherent nature of man as one interested in cost-benefit analysis. 67 But
Bentham thinks that nature has placed mankind under the governance of two separate concepts, pain and pleasure; and these two govern humans in all they do. 68 Indeed, even the most basic human action could be justified on economic grounds of opportunity cost. Although individuals may be mistaken in this calculation process, the human nature automatically uses opportunity cost as the criterion in making choices and preferences because generally individuals aim to maximise their self-interest. 69 The role of regulation then should be in helping with the evaluation of the risk and benefit balance with consideration for the same calculation for others who might be affected by the actions. Getting this balance right, again will steer most actions to donate in the direction of being ethical, but not necessarily altruistic.
Where a system allows for reasonable compensation, it permits reimbursement for the costs of making donations, including medical expenses and lost earnings for live donors. This is because such costs could act as disincentive even to donors with no interests in the compensation other than to donate to save lives. Payments to cover legitimate costs of procurement and of ensuring the safety, quality and efficacy of human cell and tissue products and organs for transplantation are also accepted as long as the human body and its parts are not 73 The argument then should be that it is not absolutely non-commercialisation that is ethical, but not to commercialise the process such that the profits are unconnected with the wellbeing and or welfare of the parties involved, especially the donor.
Emerging Markets and the Iranian Model Example
Across the countries and legal systems one finds various shades of the changing attitudes towards the commercialisation of body parts. They range from extreme cases of absolute ban through to where the exchange of body parts for non-monetary rewards are allowed; down to where a system covertly or otherwise allows one to claim a fee for his or her body part. As the cursory survey above shows.
Besides kind, with the apparent intention of assisting the sick and the impoverished, as well as providing appropriate financial compensation to the poor. This system of using a government-sponsored agency to recruit donors has been successful in eliminating waiting lists for kidney patients; however, it is not without controversy. Within Iran, the ethical debates surrounding this system continue among both physicians and scholars. Economists, including Nobel-laureate Gary
Becker, and professionals within the transplant industry worldwide, suggest that a system of financial compensation for kidney donors will increase the supply of much-needed organs, thereby reducing the death and suffering of dialysis patients. In this regard, Iran is often looked to as a model for other countries.
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The problem of the exploitation of donors is controlled by creating an official mechanism that controls and supervises transplants, and looks after the interests of the vendors.
According to Hippen, insofar as the kidney procurement system in Iran can be characterized as a "market," it is a highly standardized and regulated market with only modest room for negotiation. Vendors are paid in two ways. First, the Iranian government provides a fixed compensation to the vendor, plus limited health insurance cover. This cover currently extends to one year after the procedure, and covers only conditions deemed related to the surgery.
Second, the vendor receives separate remuneration either from the recipient or, if the recipient is impoverished, from one of a series of designated charitable organizations.
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The most contentious disagreements in the literature regarding kidney vending in Iran have to do with the personal, physical, and financial consequences for vendors themselves. management of vendors as there is for the process leading up to the sale of organs. The available data show that the quality of life organ vendors live after the procedure is relatively less than that of non-organ vendors. 78 Although the reasons for this reduced quality of life is diverse, there are certainly psycho-social complications that the vendor is left with, too many for the system to control as it currently stands. It is not only a moral failure, but a systemic and an institutional one, capable of being corrected.
There is a proposal in the neighbouring Israel which could be copied. A live donor whose organ is incompatible with a particular recipient may be able to trade his organ for a suitable match. 79 Alternatively, the donors could be given priority for themselves or their family when a future medical need might arise. Moreover, one could be allowed to trade in return of particular social benefits relating to education, health and family needs. 80 Although no money is involved in this method, it does mirror the proposal of Matas involving tax-free payment to donors in support of aftercare. credit, or perhaps seeks the highest bidder not the one in the greatest need. Some price and exchange control should be the direction of policy, not absolute ban on the practice. If policy and lawmakers are still stuck in the past, the horse has long bolted while they struggle to close the stable door -see the booming black market.
